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Genung‟s Theory of Persuasion:  





 John Genung‟s late nineteenth century rhetoric textbooks, although 
founded on an eighteenth century model of Scottish composition, present an 
original conception of oratory. Genung‟s theory breaks free of the classical 
models and lays out the path to be followed during the development of speech 
studies among American rhetoricians of the early twentieth century.  
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Genung‟s Theory of Persuasion:  
A Literary Theory of Oratory of Late Nineteenth-Century America 
 
 John F. Genung‟s (1887) The Practical Elements of Rhetoric with Illustrative 
Examples, a North American rhetoric manual of the late nineteenth century, 
represents the literary approach to rhetorical studies that was typical of that era. 
Influenced by the Belles Lettres tradition in rhetoric, Genung‟s book is more 
reminiscent of the Ramistic heritage of rhetorical studies than of the Ciceronian, 
if one may make such a distinction, for Genung often treats oratory as a species 
of literature that in some ways is subordinate to writing. Although cloaked in 
faculty psychology, his ideas unmistakably foreshadow approaches to public 
speaking that are, a century later, routinely taught in most college public 
speaking courses. 
In this and a revised work, The Working Principles of Rhetoric, Genung 
(1900) presents in germinal form more of the concepts of rhetoric that dominated 
twentieth century approaches to public speaking. At the same time, Genung‟s 
work represents a tradition against which rhetorical scholars interested in 
oratory would soon rebel. It is difficult to overestimate the influence of Genung‟s 
approach to rhetoric, an influence that developed, in part, as direct impact on 
rhetorical thought, and in part, as the stimulus for reaction.  
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Too often, one takes the academic approaches of the present day for 
granted. Genung‟s work contributed to a North American approach to academic 
rhetoric. His Practical Elements dominated composition education near the end of 
the nineteenth century (Berlin 1984, 75; Connors 1997, 132). Genung‟s work was 
cited even after it passed out of print, to the point that Thonssen included some 
brief selections from Genung in a 1942 anthology of readings about rhetoric 
(Thonssen 1942, 311-314). Like many things American, Genung‟s work blazes a 
new path, one that would eventually but indirectly lead to the distinctly American 
tradition of rhetorical studies, founded in but advancing beyond the ancient 
theories, that would emerge a few decades later.  
Genung (1887) defines rhetoric as “the art of adapting discourse, in 
harmony with its subject and occasion, to the requirements of a reader or hearer” 
(1). Genung‟s (1887) book mostly treats rhetoric as a matter of organization (248-
300) and language style (13-214)—as dispositio and elocutio, although he employs 
no such terms. He covers invention under several chapter titles; for example, 
“Invention dealing with Observed Objects” (Genung 1887, 326-354). Much of 
what he calls invention, however, a later rhetorician might treat as disposition; 
for example, Genung (1887) treats narration under invention (355-383). These 
attitudes of Genung‟s make the brief discussions of oratory, argumentation, and 
persuasion that he tucks in the back of his textbooks even more intriguing. It is 
upon these latter sections that this essay concentrates.  
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 Anyone who scans an American composition textbook of, say, the 1960‟s, 
will easily see many ways, large and small, in which it reflects ideas such as 
Genung‟s. Berlin characterizes Genung‟s aim as to rework rhetorical education, 
particularly composition education, to free it from the classical models. 
Nonetheless, Berlin argues that Genung did not free himself from the influence 
of Blair, Campbell, and Whately. Instead, Genung found himself mired in an 
eighteenth century model of composition. Berlin (1981) also notes Genung‟s 
reliance on an outdated faculty psychology (74-75, 82-83). Berlin (1984) argues 
that writing instruction in the United States in general rebelled against English 
models of education (6-7). This may account for the turn toward the Scottish 
rhetoricians, Blair and Campbell (Berlin 1984, 62-63). Berlin (1984) feels that 
writing instructors of the late nineteenth century abandoned the classical model 
“partly because it was grounded in a noetic field that was being repudiated 
everywhere, but nowhere with such fervor as in America” (6). Although John 
Quincy Adams‟ work, grounded in the Aristotelian tradition, had been 
published, it had little influence in the face of this massive rejection of the old 
models (Berlin 1984, 15). Adams stressed that “The peculiar and highest 
characteristic, which distinguishes man from the rest of the animal kingdom, is 
REASON” (Adams 1801, 1:13-14). Berlin may be right that rhetorical theorists of 
the late nineteenth century were deliberately rebelling against such rationalistic 
theories (Berlin 1984, 13-17). 
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Summarizing Genung‟s approach to rhetoric, Cohen (1994) notes 
Genung‟s definition of rhetoric as encompassing the spoken and written word, 
Genung‟s acceptance of the definition between conviction and persuasion, and 
his reliance on a faculty psychology (18-20). Whately (1846) developed an 
influential theory of rhetoric founded on faculty psychology. Whately divides his 
book into sections on the appeals to the understanding and the appeals to the 
will, as well as style and delivery. Genung‟s textbooks appear to follow this 
pattern, although Genung (1887) greatly amplifies the discussion of style, while 
slighting delivery.  
 The Ciceronian tradition in rhetoric encompasses the five canons of 
invention, arrangement, elocution, delivery, and memory. One does, of course, 
find evidence of these canons in the work of various ancient writers, including 
the Rhetorica Ad Herennium (Kennedy 1972, 110-112), and these authors may have 
drawn on a further tradition, perhaps an oral one (Kennedy 1972, 126-138). 
One might look to Peter Ramus, however, in order to take in the 
viewpoint of Genung‟s work. The idea behind Ramus‟ reforms of education was 
to divide learning into various distinct areas of study, each area to fall under a 
specialty. Ramus (1986) complained against Quintilian, for example, that 
“Quintilian follows Aristotle‟s and Cicero‟s confusion of dialectic and rhetoric” 
(80). Ramus (1986) continues that Quintilian threw into his study of rhetoric 
almost every other subject as well (80). This moved Ramus to limit rhetoric to 
delivery and stylistic ornament (Ramus 1986, 86; Ramus 1969, 55). In Lanham‟s 
Genung‟s Theory of Persuasion  7 
(1993) interesting perception, Ramus made rhetoric into one of the “cosmetic 
arts,” independent of philosophical ideas (157). 
In no way did Ramus anticipate that a student would be exposed to one 
subject only, to the exclusion of others. Unfortunately, perhaps, but predictably, 
students quickly began to specialize just like their professors (Howell 1956, 146-
155). Over the centuries, scholars of language sometimes taught their field as if it 
were rhetoric entire, excluding from their examination such matters as argument, 
or how to present an oral argument to a live audience.  
Blair often seems to fall into this tradition, but it is entirely unclear that 
Blair himself was ever as limited in his view of rhetoric as were his followers. He 
certainly understands that style is only a part of persuasion:  
For, according as society improves and flourishes, men acquire more 
influence over one another by means of reasoning and discourse; and in 
proportion as that influence is felt to enlarge, it must follow, as a natural 
consequence, that they will bestow more care upon the methods of 
expression their conceptions with propriety and eloquence. (Blair 1861, 9-
10) 
Blair recognizes that style could never be all of rhetoric; it is simply the area of 
rhetoric that interests him. Unfortunately, it became all too easy for rhetoric 
manuals of the late 1800‟s, following in Blair‟s tradition, to slight audience 
analysis, speech content, and delivery, all of which are likewise essential to 
effective spoken rhetoric.  
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Genung did not follow Ramus‟ system, but was Ramistic in the sense that 
he did not reassemble and integrate the canons. He still envisioned rhetoric as in 
large part the study of style. His faculty psychology led him to treat one canon of 
rhetoric as an appeal to one faculty, and a different canon as an appeal to some 
other faculty. He did, however, look toward the twentieth century by moving 
toward a more comprehensive study of rhetoric that included invention and 
arrangement. The discussion of oral persuasion seemed like an afterthought, 
being confined to a small section near the back of his books, but nonetheless 
represented a positive step toward the resurgence of oratorical studies of the 
early twentieth century. In his discussion of persuasion, Genung attempted to 
revert to a more comprehensive view of oratory. He carefully examined the 
manner in which an orator would interact with and persuade an audience, but 
did so in a way that reflected little awareness of the learning embodied in 
rhetoric manuals in the Ciceronian tradition.  
Unlike a rhetorical theorist of a hundred years later (or, perhaps, earlier), 
Genung takes the position that persuasion is concerned with “truths, but truths 
of a particular kind.” Where argumentation tests the truth of a writer‟s claims, 
persuasion investigates truths that are “practical” or “personal.” “In a word,” 
writes Genung, “the whole sphere of duty, interest, privilege, happiness, 
conduct, is open to the work of persuasion” (Genung 1887, 447). This perspective 
immediately prevents Genung from addressing persuasion as involving a 
combination of several arts comparable to the canons of rhetoric. Guided by 
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faculty psychology, Genung has trouble coming to terms with the possibility that 
expository writing could be persuasive, for example, or that persuasive oratory 
could be informative. This is clearest when he comments that “Persuasion is so 
predominantly the work of oral communication, it so almost necessarily requires 
the close contact of personal presence. [. . .] Persuasion presupposes a speaker at 
close quarters with his audience” (Genung 1887, 449).  
 Genung‟s examination of persuasion thus takes the perspective of the 
speaker rather than the writer. Persuasion tries “to make the hearer see and feel 
that his interest and duty lie in the adoption of a certain prescribed line of 
conduct or belief” (Genung 1887, 456). He stresses as the first principle of 
persuasion the “alliance” between the speaker and audience. The speaker seeks 
to “enlist their sympathies and energies in a common cause with him” (Genung 
1887, 449).  Genung briefly examines credibility, suggesting that a speaker must 
establish the trust and respect of the audience, doing so “with a manly, self-
respecting frankness.” The speaker should “approach his audience as men 
occupying a common ground with himself, as having rights, abilities, opinions, 
that are to be respected and conciliated” (Genung 1887, 449).  
 As a further principle, Genung (1887) stresses the importance of the 
absence of “the appearance of any kind of artifice” and of adapting to the 
audience (450). This requires, in Genung‟s (1887) view, “an intuitive knowledge 
of men.” This intuitive knowledge, Genung implies, is to be found by studying 
the audience members‟ physiques (Genung 1887, 452). He quotes favorably from 
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Henry Ward Beecher‟s explanation of the importance of being aware of the size 
of an audience member‟s brow, the shape of his head, the texture of the hair, and 
the height of the forehead. Indeed, advancing beyond mere phrenology, the 
lengthy quotation from Beecher also explains the importance of analyzing an 
audience member‟s stomach, which organ reflects the person‟s “natural forces.”  
All of these, one is led to believe, reflect the construction of a person‟s brain and 
therefore offer the speaker information about the person‟s temperament (Genung 
1887, 452-453).  
 Then again, Genung recognizes that the aim of persuasion is “the 
achievement of an object” rather than to expound eloquently on a topic. Thus, 
developing his faculty psychology, Genung (1887) divides persuasion into the 
“address to the intellect” (456-459), the “address to the feelings” 459-463), and the 
“address to the will” (463-468). He judges the address to the intellect to be 
indispensable to effective persuasion. However, this, “so far is it is merely 
thought,” cannot lead the audience to action (Genung 1887, 457). Genung (1887) 
urges that argumentation is more important in the address to the intellect than is 
narrative (458). He advises speakers to make the address to the intellect with 
“simplicity,” “plainness,” and “directness” (458).  
 Moving to the feelings, Genung (1887) suggests that appeals to the 
emotions are necessary to move human beings from their natural state of 
lethargy. He compares the orator‟s appeal to the emotions to “overcoming 
inertia” (Genung 1887, 459). Genung quotes Marc Antony‟s funeral oration for 
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Julius Caesar, from Shakespeare‟s play, as an admirable example of an orator‟s 
appeal to the emotions. Genung‟s treatment does not show clear awareness that 
Shakespeare‟s account of this speech is fictionalized: “The value of this 
knowledge of human nature, and of the considerations that will be most potent 
with the hearers, is strikingly illustrated in the speeches of Brutus and Antony, in 
Shakespeare‟s „Julius Caesar” (Genung 1887, 454). Thus, despite his attempt to 
differentiate between oratory and other literature, Genung‟s predispositions 
seem to forbid him from making the distinction in a clear, consistent manner. 
Speakers make the address to the feelings with “language, voice, and action” 
(Genung 1887, 559). This contrasts with the plain style used for the address to the 
intellect. It also implies, consistent with the faculty psychology, that the appeals 
are distinct; Genung does not seem to conceive of making a simultaneous appeal 
to the intellect and appeal to the feelings. His methods for these appeals differ 
enough to be incompatible.   
 Genung‟s discussion of the feelings remains vague. Unlike the typical 
writer of earlier rhetoric manuals, Genung makes no attempt to catalogue 
different emotions, and he does not advise the persuader which emotions are to 
be used under what circumstances. He does stress that a skilled speaker—and 
here Genung has the speaker rather than the writer in mind—must stimulate the 
emotions without showing too much emotion in giving the speech. He therefore 
warns against extravagant use of language (Genung 1887, 461-462). 
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 Last in Genung‟s list of faculties is the will. The appeal to the will, Genung 
(1887) stresses, is the ultimate and distinguishing character of persuasive 
discourse. Presaging Kenneth Burke by a half-century, Genung states that the 
speaker must identify with and appeal to the audience‟s “motives.” The motives 
are an intermediate factor between the audience‟s emotions and the audience‟s 
actions. Genung explains that “men cannot escape them, nor is it in the power of 
the soul deliberately to forswear them.” In a note, he says that “in the universal 
practical mind of men, motiveless ideas either belong to the irresponsible 
vagaries of madness, or are the mere riot of invention” (Genung 1887, 464).  
 Not forsaking moral issues, Genung (1887) briefly dismisses evil motives 
with the offhand comment that any cause using evil motives would be led to 
“deserved destruction” (464). This noble sentiment was, perhaps, more plausible 
in the era before Hitler‟s brilliantly successful rhetoric. Genung does not 
catalogue the motives, but offers three categories into which they might fall:  
 
Duty to ourselves,—  
 self-respect, prudence reputation, integrity, and the like; 
Duty to our kind,—  
 which includes also duty to country and common weal; 
Duty to God,—  
which comprises the highest and worthiest spiritual virtues. 
(Genung 1887, 465) 
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This system reflects the typical morality of late nineteenth-century America. Yet 
in no way is it intended to be a complete list, as shortly afterwards Genung gives 
examples of motives that do not clearly fall into any of these categories, for 
example, the pecuniary motive (see Genung 1887, 467).  
 Genung (1887) promptly offers examples of various speeches employing 
various motives; these include quotations from Macauley (465), Edmund Burke 
(466), and Charles James Fox (467).  Genung (1887) uses these to explicate various 
practical aspects of motive appeals, explaining that “the proposed action must be 
so placed before them as to coincide with their own desires and interests” (464). 
He stresses that appeals “to the will” must be implicit; otherwise “it is too much 
like compulsion.” Indeed, he remarks that “it is futile not to base conduct or 
proposed action on motive (464).  
Genung (1887) also discusses invective as a motive appeal (466). He does, 
however, put a positive spin on invective. He defines invective as “appeal in 
negative” and suggests that it can be used to shame an audience into acting on 
their higher motives: “Just as one may appeal to justice, patriotism, honest, 
benevolence, so he may inveigh against wrong, cowardice, meanness, 
selfishness” (Genung 1887, 466). Continuing to advocate high-mindedness, 
Genung (1887) advises that “the wise orator, therefore, who can seize the 
occasion, will seek to base his cause on motives that are both good and practical” 
(468).  
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 One notices through the above discussion Genung‟s increasing reliance on 
concepts of oral discourse. This becomes explicit in the very last section of 
Practical Elements, which looks at oratory. Genung (1887) also reiterates that “the 
form that persuasion takes in literature, being almost altogether oral address, is 
oratory” (468). Here, Genung clarifies that oratory is a branch of literature, and 
yet of a different purpose than written literature.  
 Genung analyzes several characteristics of oratory. The first of these is 
eloquence, which Genung explains in a subhead as “the Sum of the Oratoric 
Style.” He hesitantly categorizes eloquence “as impassioned prose.” He 
continues that “to true eloquence so many things are essential—the character of 
the orator, his skill in swaying the emotions and sentiments of an audience, the 
greatness of subject and occasion—that a brief definition is impossible” (Genung 
1887, 469).  
 Genung stresses that eloquence does not require a high style. Instead, “it 
is simply wise to take advantage of occasion.” He points out certain sorts of 
figures that are inappropriate in spoken style. Presaging Winans‟ view that 
public speaking is like conversation (Winans 1917, 20-25), Genung states the ideal 
of eloquence to be “dignified conversation, grappling closely and earnestly with 
the important issues of life.” Furthermore, he distinguishes the practical impulse 
of oratory, pointing out that even great flourishes of eloquence are “still at the 
impulsion of a practical end” (Genung 1887, 470-471). In this comment, Genung 
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foreshadows Wichelns‟ insistence that the purpose of oratory is not beauty but 
effect (Wichelns 1925, 209).  
 Genung (1887) advocates that speakers should offer simple arguments 
“wherein there is only one step from premise to conclusion” and that example 
and analogy are most typical of oratory. He insists that an argument in an 
oration should be offered with “its own practical application” (472).  
 Genung (1887) concludes Practical Elements with a classification of the 
different sorts of orations. One could certainly argue that Aristotle‟s three genres, 
the demonstrative, forensic, and epideictic, reflect the common practices of 
Athenian oratory (as Kennedy 1991 suggests, 7-9). Genung‟s classification, which 
appears to be at least in part original, reflects what he perceives to be the most 
common kinds of oratory of his time and place. The first of his two categories, 
“determinate oratory,” is that which “contemplates direct and immediate action 
as its result.” He divides determinate oratory into “oratory of the law, or forensic 
oratory,” which “is concerned with the general end of justice and right.” The 
second type of determinate oratory is “the oratory of legislative assemblies.” He 
seems to deplore that “parliamentary debate is becoming more and more a 
matter of business.” Political speaking, in Genung‟s view, is a sub-classification 
of legislative oratory, although “sometimes more fiery and ambitious.” Also in 
the category of determinate oratory is “Oratory of the pulpit,” which “is 
concerned with the general end of inducing men to follow Christ.” Such oratory, 
Genung advises, should not “wander too far from a definite and immediate 
Genung‟s Theory of Persuasion  16 
issue” lest it lose its effect (472-473). Genung ignores non-Christian religious 
oratory.  
 Genung‟s second category is “demonstrative oratory,” which is “that class 
of orations wherein no defined end is directly proposed,” but which attempts to 
uplift the audience “toward noble, patriotic, and honorable sentiments, and 
toward a large and worthy life.” He refers to such standard examples of 
epideictic oratory as Webster‟s Bunker Hill oration and Everett‟s speech on 
Washington (Genung 1887, 473). Genung‟s views on demonstrative oratory are 
surprisingly modern. He says that demonstrative oratory “is, or may be made, a 
great educator” (Genung 1887, 473-474; cf. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1960, 
49-51). Genung says that the voters often need to be reminded of the loftier 
sentiments as they choose on public matters. Alas, Genung concludes that “the 
work is now mostly done by journalism; but the orator‟s field is by no means 
closed, nor will it be, so long as men delight in the living voice, the warmth of 
eloquence, and the presence of influential men” (Genung 1887, 474). Thus, even 
in his praise of demonstrative oratory, Genung‟s gaze seemed to turn, in ever so 
subtle a manner, more to the written than to the oral. That is, he seemed to hold 
that the newspapers and magazines were performing the function of the orator, 
while still not being prepared to concede that oral discourse had lost either its 
importance or its aesthetic quality.  
 In his later work, Working Principles of Rhetoric, Genung (1900) revises his 
view of oratory. An interesting distinction is that he reorganizes the discussion to 
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consider oratory into a chapter about argumentation. He characterizes oratory as 
“the summit and crown of the rhetorical art” (642). He defines oratory as “public 
discourse of the argumentative type, in which truth of personal import and issue 
is presented and enforced” (642). He still holds to the view that oratory concerns 
matters “of personal import” (643). He indicates that oratory belongs to the 
“literary type” of argumentation. Since it is argumentation of “a modified, more 
impassioned character,” one can call it “persuasion” (643).  
Genung (1900) continues to rely on faculty psychology, distinguishing 
between “The Appeal to the Intellect” (651), “The Appeal to the Emotions” (654), 
and “The Appeal to the Will” (657). He advocates that an orator must appeal to 
the will “indirectly” by appealing to the audience‟s motives (Genung 1900, 658).  
 By this time, Genung‟s (1900) concept of audience analysis has become 
more sophisticated. Abandoning the study of the audience member‟s physique, 
he further develops the importance of an “alliance” with the audience (Genung 
1900, 645). He concludes that “An accomplished orator has by native 
endowment, and heightens by determinate culture, a power to read his audience, 
and to adapt himself instinctively to them.” He states, furthermore, that the 
methods of understanding an audience involve “a magnetism, which cannot be 
acquired by rule and whose source is not fully understood” (Genung 1900, 647). 
It is difficult to imagine a student of Cicero or Quintilian making such an 
admission, which, for all practical purposes, forsakes any attempt at a theory of 
audience analysis.  Cicero (1999) does, of course, note the importance of natural 
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ability in the orator‟s development (sec. 122-123, p. 85). Thus, although Genung 
offers some excellent advice to the speaker, that advice did not include specific 
tools.  
Developing an understanding of the audience, Genung, however, asserts 
the importance of a simple style that suits “popular apprehension.” Genung‟s 
(1900) “ideal” requires the speaker “to use up as little of the hearer‟s energy as 
possible in merely understanding” (653). He also points out the benefit of 
repetition. Although they show little respect for the audience, these comments 
foreshadow the conversational approach to public speaking education. Most 
interestingly, in this later version, Genung perceives more precisely the 
importance of argumentation and exposition as fundamental to oratory (652-
653). Realizing the importance of credibility, Genung (1900) writes that “the 
initiative . . . must be such as to inspire confidence both in him as an able and 
honest man, and in his subject as he presents it” (646).  
 Genung‟s view, especially prominent in his earlier work, that written 
literature is typically expository while spoken literature is typically persuasive 
seems quite strange a century later. Under the influence of Kenneth Burke, many 
modern rhetoricians see all forms of human discourse, including essays, poems, 
and even quite exotic events, as being rhetorical in one sense or other (see, e.g., 
Burke 1969, 9-10, 116-123). Genung clearly recognizes the importance of 
persuasion, audience analysis, and the like, but employs minimal scholarly tools 
to develop them theoretically or pedagogically. This was both bad and good: bad 
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because it deprives the student of the techniques necessary for effective public 
speaking, but good, to a degree, because Genung started the task of developing a 
uniquely North American framework for oratory unimpeded by ancient models.  
Although his discussion of oratory displays knowledge of Whately‟s 
Elements of Rhetoric, Genung largely attempted to construct a theory of oratorical 
persuasion from scratch. Most notably, the discussions of oratory, persuasion, 
and argumentation nestle in short sections near the back of the books, clearly 
subordinate to Genung‟s methodical discussion of writing style. In one sense, 
Genung could be commended for discussing speech in a book about rhetoric. In 
the context of his tradition, this alone may stand as a significant contribution. 
Yet, he does not integrate his discussion of oratory with the discussion of 
grammar and style in the larger part of his books. Although Genung perceived 
differences between the oral and the written, the work as a whole clearly stresses 
rhetoric as verbal expression. Thus, Genung‟s work stands in the tradition of 
Blair and Campbell, but takes steps, perhaps tentative steps, toward the dramatic 
resurgence of oratorical studies that was to arise in the United States in a few 
years.  
Works such as Genung‟s, which subordinated oratory to literature, and 
did so without clear theoretical reason, set the stage for the dramatic resurgence 
of oratorical theory and teaching that occurred in the United States during the         
first three decades of the twentieth century. Lyon (1915) advocated “a clear-cut 
division” between English and speech in universities (44). This may have, in part, 
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been a rebellion against an approach that subordinated speech to literature. 
Suggesting that college students be taught an extemporaneous method of 
speaking, Robinson (1915) stated that “The boy must not be subjected to the 
danger of falling back of [sic] those eighteenth-century models of composition 
which he learned to follow in high school” (223). The time had come to rebuild 
the theory of oral discourse on a new foundation. Nonetheless, Genung‟s 
emphasis clearly endured in the continuing stress on naturalness and clarity of 
expression. Genung pointed out the importance of analyzing and adapting to the 
audience, even though he lacked tools to explain how to do so. He broke free of 
the genres of Aristotle, thus opening the opportunity to examine the kinds of 
speeches typical of North American culture. Thus, even after rhetoricians 
returned to classical models, a uniquely North American approach to spoken 
rhetoric had arrived.  
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